

1964

The next day a bipartisan majority of the Senate Judiciary Committee introduced a proposed amendment containing the essentials of the revised Eisenhower proposal.³³ The Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments quickly approved this resolution and reported it favorably to the Judiciary Committee on March 12. Despite its impressive support and sponsorship the proposal's momentum was lost in the Judiciary Committee, and when the 85th Congress adjourned in August the amendment was still pending without having been acted upon.

In the 86th Congress the Eisenhower proposal was reintroduced by Senator Kefauver.³⁴ The Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments issued notice of public hearings on March 12, 1959, but no witnesses came forward. Chairman Kefauver then inquired of Attorney General Rogers whether he had supplemental testimony to that given in 1958. Rogers replied on April 6, 1959, that his support of the amendment continued to be enthusiastic but that he was content to stand on his prior testimony without a further personal appearance.³⁵ On May 11 the subcommittee again approved the amendment and reported it to the Senate Judiciary Committee. There it languished without action for almost 16 months until the 86th Congress adjourned sine die on September 1, 1960. The committee's Legislative and Executive Calendar shows only that the proposed amendment was discussed July 20, 1959. This bare entry is the high water mark of congressional consideration of Presidential inability. It is the only record of either the House or Senate Judiciary Committee considering a favorable subcommittee report on a proposed constitutional amendment on the subject. It was an obscure climax to the gallant efforts of the Eisenhower administration.

THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION POSITION

The constitutional challenge of Presidential inability was of low priority on the New Frontier. The Kennedy administration took a somewhat passive attitude toward the entire problem. In its early days the White House press staff was severely criticized for withholding the news that the President had aggravated a back injury during a tree-planting ceremony in Ottawa, Canada.³⁶ The President's widely known war injuries and protracted illnesses while a Member of Congress made presidential health a delicate subject.

Although it has been reported that a tentative informal agreement similar to the Eisenhower-Nixon pact was made between Kennedy and Johnson in December, 1960,³⁷ before their taking office in January 1961, it was August 10, 1961, before it was officially announced that such an agreement had been formalized. The opinion of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy which was released at the time concluded that the agreement was constitutional in that it was based upon valid interpretations of the succession clause and that it came as close to spelling out a practical solution to the problem as is possible.³⁸ The only reference in the opinion to a possible need for constitutional amend-

ment was a statement that the agreement may prove to be a persuasive precedent of what the Constitution means until it is amended or other action is taken.³⁹

In the meantime, Senator Kefauver had reintroduced the Eisenhower proposal in the 87th Congress⁴⁰ and had begun attempts to secure a statement of position from the Kennedy administration. On March 9, 1961, the Senate Judiciary Committee requested a routine report from the Department of Justice on the proposal; it reported almost a year later that no response was ever received.⁴¹ Nothing further occurred in the 87th Congress.

The administration first took a position on the constitutional amendment question on June 18, 1963, when Deputy Attorney General Nicholas de B. Katzenbach testified at hearings of the Constitutional Amendments Subcommittee.⁴² Mr. Katzenbach opposed the Eisenhower proposal on the grounds that it would be unwise to freeze into the Constitution a fixed procedure for inability determinations. However, he gave a guarded acquiescence to the simpler enabling amendment⁴³ which was endorsed at that time by the American Bar Association.

This proposal, which Katzenbach considered the best of the three pending before the subcommittee, authorizes Congress to provide by law a method for determining commencement and termination of inability. It also clarifies the status and tenure of a Vice President who acts as President during presidential inability.

The enabling amendment has both respectable bar support and an impressive recent history. It originated in 1957 in a special subcommittee of the New York State Bar Association composed of Arthur Dean, Elihu Root, and Martin Taylor.⁴⁴ It was endorsed by that association in 1957, by the American Bar Association in 1960,⁴⁵ and by the Bar Association of the City of New York in 1962.⁴⁶ It was cosponsored in 1963 by Senators Kefauver and KEATING, who had previously sponsored competing proposals which specified procedures for determining inability.⁴⁷ (Each reserved the right to support his previous plan for the implementing legislation if the enabling amendment were adopted.)

Although this approach merely postpones an ultimate congressional decision on method, it has the obvious advantage of flexibility for the future. Katzenbach suggested no particular procedure for future legislation, but he did not disapprove the Cabinet-Vice President method of the Eisenhower proposal and left the way open for it to be selected by a future Congress as the statutory method if the enabling amendment were adopted. The principal objection

to the enabling amendment has been that in violation of the separation-of-powers principle it would permit Congress to vest in itself the power to make inability determinations and thus would jeopardize the independence of the Executive. Katzenbach viewed the power of the President to veto such legislation, subject to being overridden by a two-thirds vote, as sufficient protection against inability legislation unacceptable to the Executive.

This slight boost from the administration was enough. The enabling amendment sponsored by the ABA was quickly approved by the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments and reported to the full Judiciary Committee on June 25, 1963. Further favorable action was considered likely until the untimely death of Senator Kefauver in August removed the responsible subcommittee chairman and the most active Senate proponent of the measure. No action was taken in the Judiciary Committee. The matter was at a virtual standstill when the first session of the 88th Congress adjourned in the fall.

AFTERMATH OF THE ASSASSINATION

The circumstances of the Kennedy assassination and the Johnson succession to the Presidency produced unparalleled public interest in the problems of presidential succession and inability. But the Eisenhower years had proved that temporarily aroused public interest alone is not sufficient. The fact that a Senate subcommittee had approved an inability proposal had failed twice in the recent past to herald further action. Although the Kennedy administration had indicated passive approval of a proposed amendment, much more aggressive executive support in the past had failed to break through congressional resistance. Also, the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations had approved different proposals and there was little affirmative indication of any substantial lessening of the general disagreement which stultified the House Judiciary efforts in 1957.

These are some of the considerations which led President Walter Craig of the American Bar Association to convene the special 2-day Conference on Presidential Inability and Succession in Washington, D.C., on January 20, 1964. Like President Johnson's admonition, "Come let us reason together," it was an attempt to find a consensus of informed and interested lawyers through a deliberative process of give-and-take discussion. No comparable effort had ever been made in this area. It offered a fresh opportunity to cut through the conflict and divergence which had caused many to abandon the cause.

A consensus emerged which, upon analysis, essentially weds the Eisenhower and Kennedy positions. The specific inability procedure of the Eisenhower proposal is combined with a grant to Congress of a residual power to alter it. This combines the flexibility of the enabling amendment with the substantive inability procedure which was so carefully evolved by the Eisenhower administration.

THE ABA CONFERENCE CONSENSUS ON PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY⁴⁸

1. Agreements between the President and Vice President or person next in line of succession provide a partial solution but not

⁴⁸ A point of the consensus outside the scope of this paper concerns filling vacancies in the Vice Presidency. It provides:

"It is highly desirable that the office of Vice President be filled at all times. An amendment to the Constitution should be adopted providing that when a vacancy occurs in the office of Vice President, the President shall nominate a person who, upon approval by the elected Members of Congress meeting in joint session, shall become Vice President for the unexpired term."

³³ Id at 27.

³⁴ S.J. Res. 19, 87th Cong., 1st sess. (1961).

³⁵ Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, "Constitutional Amendments," S. Rep. No. 1305, 87th Cong., 2d sess. 26 (Mar. 15, 1962).

³⁶ Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st sess. 32 (1963).

³⁷ S.J. Res. 35, 88th Cong., 1st sess. (1963).

³⁸ Statements of Cornelius W. Wickersham and Martin Taylor, 1957 House hearings, 32, 35.

³⁹ See note 2 supra.

⁴⁰ 17 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 185, 202 (1962).

⁴¹ Kefauver had supported the Eisenhower proposal. KEATING had proposed an amendment which would establish a Presidential Inability Commission composed of the Speaker of the House, the House minority leader, the Senate majority and minority leaders, the Secretaries of State and the Treasury, and the Attorney General, with the Vice President as nonvoting Chairman. (S.J. Res. 125, 87th Cong., 1st sess. (1961).)

"Sec. 4. Whenever the President declares in writing that his inability is terminated, the President shall forthwith discharge the powers and duties of his office."

According to Nixon, President Eisenhower personally composed the agreement and delivered it to him and Attorney General Rogers in early February 1958. (Nixon, "My Six Crises," 178 (1961).)

³⁸ S.J. Res. 161, 85th Cong., 2d sess. (1958).

³⁹ S.J. Res. 40, 86th Cong., 2d sess. (1959).

⁴⁰ Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, "Constitutional Amendments," S. Rep. No. 1305, 87th Cong., 2d sess. 7 (1960).

⁴¹ Hansen, op. cit. supra note 6, at 69.

⁴² Id at 78.

⁴³ 42 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 5, at 26 (1961).

14102

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

June 22

an acceptable permanent solution to the problem.

The agreement has never been claimed to be a solution to the underlying constitutional problems. It is primarily valuable as an advance indication of the understandings of the parties of their relative positions in the limited situations which it contemplates. In the Garfield crisis such an agreement would probably have led Vice President Arthur to act as President. In the Wilson crisis it is doubtful that it would have caused any change.

It provides no check against a President who is determined to exercise his office although he is in fact disabled. In all events, it depends upon the good faith of the parties and has no force of law.

2. An amendment to the Constitution of the United States should be adopted to resolve the problems which would arise in the event of inability of the President to discharge the powers and duties of his office.

Although there is a respectable body of opinion that Congress presently has power to legislate to provide an inability procedure, the majority view is negative^{*} and it is generally conceded that all uncertainties should be settled by a comprehensive constitutional amendment. The argument in favor of legislative authority is based upon the necessary and proper clause which authorizes Congress "to make all laws which may be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or office thereof."^{**} The assumed power of the Vice President to undertake the exercise of the office in the event of a presidential inability is viewed as a power vested in an officer of the United States for which Congress may legislate a means of execution. The same argument would permit statutory regulation of the resumption of office by the President when he recovered from an inability.

The persuasive answer to this argument is the structure of the succession clause itself, which by specifically granting to Congress the power to legislate concerning the inability of both the President and the Vice President implies that such power is withheld when only one of the two executive incumbents is disabled. This distinction takes added weight from the fact that when the succession clause was drafted the Vice President was to be the person who received the second number of votes for President in the electoral college.[†] The clause thus indicates an intention to insulate these two, both of whom were in office as the result of receiving votes for the Presidency, from legislative inference.

3. The Constitution should be amended to provide that in the event of the death, resignation, or removal of the President, the Vice President or the person next in line of succession shall succeed to the office for the unexpired term.

The first of the substantive recommendations, this would embody the Tyler precedent in the Constitution for all cases of succession to the Presidency for reasons other than inability.

4. The amendment should provide that in the event of the inability of the President the powers and duties, but not the office, shall devolve upon the Vice President or person next in line of succession for the duration of the inability of the President or until expiration of his term of office.

This is a corollary to the third point. As an interpretation of the Constitution it now is an underlying assumption of the Eisenhower-Nixon agreement. Placing it in the Constitution would insure that the basis of the Tyler precedent would never be extended to inability situations to preclude a disabled President from resuming office upon recovery. This would remove the uncertainty which has contributed so heavily to the failure of Vice Presidents to act in serious cases of presidential inability.

Points 3 and 4 are largely noncontroversial and are included in virtually all proposed amendments.

5. The amendment should provide that the inability of the President may be established by a declaration in writing of the President. In the event that the President does not make known his inability, it may be established by action of the Vice President or person next in line of succession with the concurrence of the majority of the Cabinet,[‡] or by action of such other body as the Congress may, by law, provide.

Upon ratification, such an amendment would provide an immediate self-implementing procedure whereby the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet could determine the existence of an operative inability requiring the Vice President to act. In this respect, it follows the initial Eisenhower proposal and reflects a widely held opinion that this decision should be within the executive branch, respecting the separation of powers and insuring that the decision is made by persons in close proximity to the President and presumably loyal to him.

The provision also incorporates the principle of the enabling amendment previously supported by the ABA and by the Kennedy administration. It authorizes Congress, by law, to substitute some other inability determining body for the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet acting concurrently. This provides the flexibility for future circumstances which Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach thought to be imperative. If Congress attempts by law to prescribe an unacceptable procedure or to reserve the determination to itself the veto power should protect the Executive.

6. The amendment should provide that the ability of the President to resume the powers and duties of his office shall be established by his declaration in writing. In the event that the Vice President and the majority of the Cabinet or such other body as Congress may, by law, provide shall not concur in the declaration of the President, the continuing inability of the President may then be determined by a vote of two-thirds of the elected Members of each House of Congress.

This point deals with the most difficult problem, the disabled President who nonetheless attempts to resume the exercise of his office. There is understandable reluctance on the part of many to deal with this contingency by constitution provision. It ultimately could be the means of preventing an elected President from exercising the office against his will. It is included for much the same reasons the Eisenhower proposal was revised in 1958 to include a similar provision. The power is so closely guarded that it surely would be used only in a compelling case. The Vice President, a majority of the Cabinet and two-thirds of Congress must concur to prevent a President from resuming office.

^{*} Since the Cabinet is not a constitutional term, the amendment itself should refer to "heads of the departments of the executive branch of the Government." As a statement of principle, the amendment should not liberally left draftsmanship problems to future implementation.

The congressional participation is consistent with the concept underlying veto and impeachment; the President is subordinate only to a two-thirds vote of each House of Congress.

Unlike the previous ABA-proposed and Kennedy-approved enabling amendment, points 5 and 6 have the Eisenhower proposal's advantage of being self-executing. They could not fail because of congressional stalemate or inaction. The power of decision is lodged in a body which is reasonably certain to be in existence. The chief effect upon the procedures of the memorandum agreement would be the cautious check upon a disabled President's returning to office.

Like most new and prospective enactments, this one undoubtedly contains some difficulties and pitfalls not now foreseeable. If so, the power of Congress to establish a different procedure should be sufficient protection.

CONCLUSION

As a marriage of the two proposals which have the greatest past acceptance, the consensus recommendation should receive widespread acceptance. It meets the objections which the Kennedy administration had to the Eisenhower proposal and the objections of supporters of the Eisenhower plan to the enabling amendment. It does not appear to be subject to any legitimate criticism which executive branch spokesmen have leveled in the past at proposed amendments. The method by which it evolved should indicate widespread acceptance in academic and professional circles.

Executive support continues to be the key. Experience has shown that no proposal so intimately concerned with the internal affairs of the executive can secure congressional approval without affirmative presidential encouragement. Time may also be of the essence. If public interest subsides and general apathy and indifference return to the subject of presidential succession, the Eisenhower experience shows that executive voices can go unheard in Congress. Only another crisis could then arouse the necessary public concern. We cannot be sure that our present incomplete and makeshift methods will let us escape the next executive crisis without serious damage to the Republic.

DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR
APPROPRIATIONS, 1965

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The hour of 2 o'clock having arrived, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 10433) making appropriations for the Department of the Interior and related agencies for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965, and for other purposes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator withhold his suggestion of the absence of a quorum? Before the quorum call, I wish to make a brief speech.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I withhold it.

U.S. ASIAN POLICY

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, President Johnson's comments in San Francisco about our Asian policy grossly overstepped his moral and legal rights. His reference to an "offensive in pursuit of peace based on overwhelming military power" is as artful a piece of doubletalk as has been uttered in the cold war. No

^{*} See Hansen, op. cit. supra note 6, at 101; 1957 analysis 58; Silva, op. cit. supra note 6, at 91.

^{**} U.S. Constitution, art. I, sec. 8, cl. 18.
[†] U.S. Constitution art. II, sec. 1, cl. 3; superseded by the 12th amendment in 1804.

1964

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

14103

President is alone entitled to threaten war or to commit the United States to war. Before he undertakes to rattle the American saber, as he did in San Francisco, he is obliged to take up the matter with Congress, because under the Constitution only Congress can make war.

The President's lamentable excuse is said to be that the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization gives him all the power he needs. But he should read the treaty again. It makes no provision for war by the Organization as a whole, much less by the United States acting alone. It calls for nothing more than consultation.

If the President wishes to lean on SEATO as the excuse for what he is doing in Asia, he is at least bound to obtain the participation of all the members of the Organization. SEATO is not coping with the southeast Asian crisis; there has been no SEATO action either in Vietnam or in Laos.

The only way the President can act in Asia under the SEATO treaty is to get agreement from all its members for a joint war effort in Laos or Vietnam or both. Until he does that, he is only seeking to deceive the American people by referring to it.

The SEATO organization is in fact defunct. It was never anything more than a subterfuge of John Foster Dulles for American action in a part of the world we had not entered before. This administration is following a policy born in deception, and it is tearing up the U.S. Constitution in the process, to say nothing of violating our commitments under the United Nations Charter, particularly in articles 33, 37, and 51. We also are in clear violation of the Geneva accords.

President Johnson is making the United States the world's leading threat to world peace; and he will discredit himself and his administration in the eyes of history if he leaves our people the legacy of a unilateral war in Asia. Even President Eisenhower declined in 1954 to commit this country to a unilateral war in Indochina, unsupported by allies or a specific mutual defense treaty.

There is not now, and had never been, an American interest in the mainland of Asia, either military or financial, that would justify our waging war on the Asian mainland.

No such interest has ever been spelled out in any treaty that could be remotely called binding on this country to commit acts of war. No such interest has ever been described to Congress or to the American people.

A unilateral American war in Asia could not possibly be called defensive. There is no territory of the United States that is threatened, and there is no treaty commitment to defend by war other nations in the area. To the contrary, what the President and his military advisers are proposing is the entry of the United States into areas it has not entered before in Asia.

Surely China will not sit calmly by while the United States takes over southeast Asia, and moves huge additional military forces into the area to threaten other around her borders.

The only possible result of such an American adventure would be that the United States would do Russia's "job" on China, leaving the Soviet Union free from confinement on both her borders. I cannot imagine a greater service the United States could do the Soviet Union than to whittle down her Chinese adversary, at a huge and bloody cost to ourselves.

I trust neither China nor Russia; but, Mr. President, I think we are walking into a trap, and I think we are walking into a trap while at the same time we are in clear violation of our international law obligations.

To say we are defending freedom in southeast Asia is the greatest hypocrisy of all. As one Republican Congressman wrote me last week:

The Governments of North Vietnam and South Vietnam are just about tweedledum and tweedledee, and neither the people nor the governments on either side would recognize democracy if they should meet it in broad daylight and on the main street of Saigon.

It is time for the American people to demand that their representatives in Congress stand up and be heard on this usurpation of the power of Congress and on the issue of war in Asia. They should demand to know where Members stand now, before the election—not afterward, when it may be too late.

The threats of war made by Admiral Felt make all too clear that American policy in southeast Asia is being made by the Pentagon.

Mr. President, I never expected to live so long as to hear an American admiral announce to the world that we are going to war in Asia if we do not have our way. I never believed that a man in the uniform of our country would be allowed to exercise that function, power, which he pretended he had the right to exercise, in his statements in Taipei. Admiral Felt had no authority or right to announce in behalf of the United States that we will go to war in Asia. Mr. President, if such announcements are to be made, they should come from the President and from Congress, not from the American military. In my judgment, Dean Rusk has become little more than an Assistant Secretary of State, carrying out the war plans of the Pentagon.

If the President has fallen in line with those plans, then the American people will have to save themselves by making their voices heard now, not only to the President, but to Congress.

Mr. President, last night, in a speech I made at a Presbyterian Church in Washington, D.C., I discussed what I consider to be some of the basic problems of morality involved in America's course of action. I expressed concern about the principles of American Christendom and the position of American churches in regard to the great moral issue that is raised in South Vietnam. I now repeat on the floor of the Senate what I said last night in that Presbyterian Church speech: I am greatly concerned about what is happening to the sense of American moral values, to the extent that apparently we are willing to stand silently

by, while our Government leads us into a war which can be of major consequence in southeast Asia. If it is not stopped, American men by the hundreds of thousands will be killed in southeast Asia, while fighting ignorant, illiterate Chinese and other Asians who do not know the difference between totalitarianism and freedom, and who are led by a group of desperate Communist leaders who no longer place any value on human lives. But in spite of the immorality of it, apparently the U.S. Government is bent on making war on them.

I say, Oh, God, what has happened to the United States, and to our sense of values, that we would conduct this war making operation of immorality, when the door of the United Nations is open to us for an attempted peaceful settlement of the crisis in Asia. There rests upon us the clear responsibility of first laying the problem before the United Nations, to see what the rest of the world will be willing to do in trying to stop the holocaust that now even the President of the United States seems to be encouraging.

It is not too late to return to our senses. It is not too late to return to American ideals and to America's past record of morality and commonsense.

The proposed unilateral warmaking action of the United States in Asia will be naught but an act of international outlawry, in clear violation of our treaty commitments. I pray to my God that before it is too late, the President will see the error of his ways, and will start leading us back into the framework of international law.

TWENTIETH BIRTHDAY OF GI BILL OF RIGHTS

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, as we celebrate the 20th anniversary of the original GI bill today, it marks a special event, for we are witnessing the dying flame of the last birthday candle of what once was a glowing torch of hope for millions of veterans. The accomplishments of the GI bill are of such vast consequence that it warrants a place in the legislative history as one of the most successful laws ever enacted by the Congress of the United States.

On June 22, 1944, the GI bill was signed into law, and was to become a major factor in building the future of 8 million Americans as well as enhancing the human resources of this great Nation. This was a bill of phenomenal accomplishments, and yet one which has paid for itself by increased revenues to the government. When combined with the Korean GI bill, this legislation has increased the resources of this country by almost 1½ million skilled university educated citizens in the fields of teaching, engineering, science, and medicine alone, and in doing so we have increased the tax revenues of this country by more than a billion dollars a year in additional taxes.

Twenty years ago today, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed into law this historic bill, which stands as a

monument to the foresighted legislators of the 78th Congress who provided the opportunity for these 8 million World War II veteran Americans to reenter civilian life with hope for the future. These men, of whom eight still lend their talents to the present Senate, realized the need to give readjustment assistance to our servicemen returning to civilian life.

On this 20th anniversary of this successful bill, we are nearing the end of an era, as the educational readjustment benefits for returning veterans cease next January. As this historic period draws to a close, I can think of nothing more appropriate in building the future of our Nation than to reaffirm the faith that our predecessors showed in our veterans, by passing the cold war GI bill, S 5. As we reach this day in history, our foresighted assistance to our young veterans would mark the dawn of new progress for our Nation, if we pass S. 5. The cold war GI bill has been pending on the Senate Calendar since last July; today there are almost 5 million veterans who are waiting to see if we have the same concern for them as was shown by the 78th Congress under the original GI bill.

In the light of the phenomenal success of the GI bill in boosting the progress of our Nation, I believe the time has come to reignite that torch of opportunity for our cold war veterans. When the need for educational opportunities for these veterans is so apparent, and when previous GI bills have proven themselves to satisfy these needs, there is no alternative but to place kindling on the burning pace of progress by the passage of the cold war GI bill. In the words of President Roosevelt, as he signed the original bill into law 20 years ago today, this measure would give "emphatic notice to our men and women in our Armed Forces that the American people do not intend to let them down."

Mr. President, in commemoration of this worthy bill, I ask unanimous consent that an article from the Army Times of June 17, 1964, entitled "The GI Bill Is 20," and an article from the Veterans of Foreign Wars magazine of June 1964, "The GI Bill of Rights: Landmark of Opportunity," be printed in the RECORD, as impressive descriptions of the accomplishments of the GI bill.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Army Times, June 17, 1964]

THE GI BILL IS 20

WASHINGTON.—Within 2 weeks after troops stormed ashore at Normandy to begin the invasion of Europe, President Roosevelt was signing legislation to give them a well-rounded program of special benefits when they returned home.

The President signed the original GI bill of rights on June 22, 1944, exactly 16 days after D-day landings in France. This year marks the 20th anniversary of not only the historic D-day landings but of the special veterans programs established to help make the transition from khaki to civvies when the war ended.

The program, more than making, provided returning servicemen with loans, education, readjustment allowances, and expanded veterans hospitals and employ-

ment service. Mustering-out pay was also provided but it was not part of the GI bill package.

More than 7.8 million veterans took advantage of the educational provisions of the GI bill alone. Benefits for Korean veterans were patterned after the World War II veterans benefits program. This program is due to expire on January 31, 1965.

With the exception of the service-disabled and war orphans training programs, the VA will be out of the education business entirely after that date. Veterans' Administrator James Gleason told the House Appropriations Committee recently.

An effort is being made by Senator RALPH YARBOROUGH, Democrat, of Texas, to extend the education and loan benefits of the GI bill to cold war exservicemen but because of administration opposition passage seems unlikely. Cold-war-disabled veterans has vocational rehabilitation available to them. Cold war GI bill legislation was passed by the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee last year. It is being tied up by the Senate Democratic policy committee which so far has refused to permit the full Senate to vote on the measure.

The original GI bill began to become law in 1942 when President Roosevelt appointed a committee, headed by Army Special Services Director Brig. Gen. Frederick H. Osborn, to study the problem of educating veterans after the war.

The Osborn committee made its preliminary report, recommending a federally sponsored education and training program for war veterans on October 27, 1943. One month later, President Roosevelt asked Congress for legislation providing veterans with (a) mustering-out pay when they leave service; (b) unemployment allowances for those unable to find work, and (c) social security credits for time spent in the Armed Forces.

A Senate resolution introduced still 1 month later called for a congressional study of problems relating to the readjustment of World War II veterans to civil life. As a result, a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Finance held extensive hearings in late 1943 and 1944. The first version of what later was to become the GI bill was introduced in the House as H.R. 8917. It included all the basic provisions that later became law, plus a provision for mustering-out pay. A similar measure, S. 1617, was introduced in the Senate.

Mustering-out pay, one of the original sections of the proposed GI bill became law on February 3, 1944, as a separate measure. The GI bill was finally approved by Congress and sent to the White House for the President's signature on June 13, 1944.

President Roosevelt, in signing the GI bill, said the measure gives "emphatic notice to the men and women in our Armed Forces that the American people do not intend to let them down."

During the 2 years the original GI bill was under discussion, more than 600 bills were introduced in both Houses of Congress to provide benefits for service men and women.

The GI bill was in sharp contrast to the bonus scramble of World War I.

[From VFW magazine, June 1964]

THE GI BILL OF RIGHTS—LANDMARK OF OPPORTUNITY

Born in the holocaust of the greatest war ever visited on the world, one of the most remarkable of all veterans' programs reaches its 20th birthday this year. When June 22 arrives, few perhaps may recognize or celebrate the birthday of the World War II GI bill, yet for America and its veterans, the GI bill will rank among the most important of all laws of Congress.

To appreciate fully how farsighted were the creators of this significant legislation, we

need to recall the conditions that existed at the time it was passed.

The GI bill became law on June 22, 1944, just 16 days after the invasion of Normandy, and no one at that time with any accuracy could predict when the war against Germany and Japan might end.

But even in the midst of this great war, the sponsors of the GI bill realized the critical need to plan ahead for the greatest demobilization in the Nation's history. The eventual demobilization witnessed as many as a million men a month being discharged from service.

There was an equally urgent need to plan ahead for readjustment. Converting combat veterans back to civilians was vital.

The average length of service for World War I veterans was about 12 months. However, World War II veterans were to remain away from the mainstream of civilian life almost three times longer, more than 30 months on the average. Moreover, they would be returning to an uncertain economy as it was just beginning to retol for peacetime production.

When President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the bill, he declared that "this law gives emphatic notice to the men and women of our Armed Forces that the American people do not intend to let them down."

The Nation had faith in the young men and women who would soon be returning after smashing the power of fascism and nazism. And the veterans have kept the faith, for they in turn certainly have not let the American people down.

Farsighted though they were, I doubt that even the most ardent supporters of the GI bill could have predicted the tremendous impact the law has had on our veterans, and on our national life. Let us take a quick look at the record and see why.

In the period after the war, the GI bill readjustment allowance program helped tide nearly 9 million veterans through the initial period while they looked for jobs. Although \$3.8 billion was expended in this program, only 900,000 veterans or about 5 percent of the total, exhausted their full rights to unemployment benefits. Most veterans just weren't content with \$20 a week, when they could be bringing home \$100 from a job, or improving their skills and education.

Under the education and training provisions of the bill, 7,800,000 veterans—nearly half of all who served during the war—received training. With well over 2 million in college and another 3,500,000 in other schools, veterans filled every nook and corner of the dormitories, laboratories, and classrooms. They attended classes at 19,000 trade and technical schools, and quonset huts dotted 2,600 campuses from the University of Maine to the University of Southern California.

About 1,400,000 veterans increased their skills in on-the-job training, and about 700,000 learned the newest agricultural techniques in on-the-farm training.

Altogether it was the largest program of adult education ever undertaken.

Some feared that the quality of education would be submerged in the flood of demobilized veterans, agreeing with one prominent educator's dour prediction that veterans returning to school under the GI bill would breed "Intellectual hobo jungles" on the campuses.

But instead of hobo jungles the colleges were filled as never before with mature, serious-minded, studious men. Professors saw that the force that overcame the dreaded Wehrmacht and withstood Kamakazi attacks were not daunted by assignments and examinations. Soon educators were united in praising the no-nonsense attitude of this

Today, we are a far stronger nation for the infusion of the skills and knowledge gained through the GI bill. In our present time of